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The relentless drive of military
technology
The current revival of the cold war and the
associated surge in the superpower arms race
have sparked a widespread and articulated con-
cern on matters ranging from the economic
consequences of uncontrolled military growth
to the danger of nuclear confrontation. It is
well to realize, however, that the record of
arms control has been rather lamentable even
when political relations were less bellicose. For
each modest step toward military restraint, the
arms race has taken several qualitative and
quantitative bounds. This is partially, though
certainly not exclusively, a consequence of the
inability to control the relentless drive of milit-
ary technology or to resist deployment of that
which this technology produces. The search for
arms limitation founders, in addition, on the
lack of mutually acceptable criteria for com-
paring, and hence balancing, the ceilings to be
imposed on both sides’ arsenal. 1
Nevertheless, even three decades is insuffi-
ciently long to cause total despair and the quest
for improved paths to arms control must dis-
play a new dose of vigor. One proposal which
merits careful examination concerns a ban, or a
very restrictive quota, on the testing of major
weapon systems.2 While this can be broadly
interpreted, my focus will be on strategic mis-
siles.
Curbs on the rate of technological in-
novation
A negotiated and sufficiently low limit on the
number of test firings of such missiles could
impose practical curbs on the rate of
technological innovation in the strategic realm
(though it could not freeze it altogether) by
inhibiting an important method of validating
new designs and of assessing incremental im-
provements to existing systems. Thus, by
hobbling the process of military growth at an
early stage, the pace of the arms race could be
controlled even in the absence of explicit ag-
reements on numerical ceilings for deployed
weapons.
Technological momentum has not only ex-
panded the size of weapons inventories but, by
increasing the accuracy and reliability of mis-
siles, it has encouraged misguided notions of
limited nuclear warfare and has exacerbated
crisis instability by endowing the concept of
preemptive counterforce strikes with a mod-
icum of plausibility. Sufficiently restrictive
limits on flight tests could, however, decrease
each side’s confidence in the reliability of its
nuclear arsenal and hence decrease the expec-
tation of first strikes. Doubts about levels of
precision could, furthermore, dampen the ap-
peal of ’limited’ nuclear exchanges. Thus, not
only would arms limitation benefit, but the
likelihood of warfare might be significantly
reduced.
Limitations on flight testing
Unlike NASA, the military in the United States
does rely extensively on flight tests at several
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stages in the development of strategic missil-
ery, notably: ( 1 ) Research & Development
(R&D) testing of the full system, (2) opera-
tional flights for early production models, and,
(3) post-deployment tests for continued opera-
tional effectiveness. Although some of the
same data can be obtained through simulations
and by the static firing of rocket motors, even
the results of surrogate modes of evaluation
should, ideally, be validated by actual opera-
tional test flights of the entire system.
Moreover, these supplementary methods of
evaluation appear less well suited to assessing
the effects of possible storage-induced de-
terioration of components. (Titan ICBMs, for
example, have not been tested in over six years
and confidence in their reliability is corres-
pondingly fragile.)
Which strategic weapons would be affected
by an agreement of this sort? This would partly
depend on the timing of such an agreement
since many of the strategic systems under cur-
rent development have been subjected to at
least some preliminary testing and an accord
would have to take virtually immediate effect
to threaten their deployment. Flight tests on the
new MX system are scheduled to begin in early
1983 and to span approximately three years.
Clearly, the fate of this system would be unaf-
fected by an agreement that took several years
to negotiate. Flight tests on the Trident II
SLBM and on the Soviet SS-N-20 submarine
launched missile have already begun and the
introduction of these missiles could only be
thwarted by an immediate test ban.
However, even a limitation on flight testing
negotiated in say three to five years could spare
both superpowers certain forms of strategic
weaponry. Ballistic missile defense systems,
for example, could be discouraged: a desirable
outcome since these could provide further en-
couragement to those who believe that a nuc-
lear war might not be an entirely devastating
affair. If an adequate interceptor missile were
to function within the atmosphere (the principle
of endo-atmospheric defense), it may have to
be based on ramjet rather than turbojet propul-
sion - a technology that could require several
more years for development. Even interceptors
designed for missions outside the atmosphere
would call for a wholly new (and rather large)
missile. A ban, or very restrictive quota, on
ramjet testing could also preclude the eventual
development of missiles built to fly on depre-
ssed trajectories - a development that would
further reduce each side’s warning time and
incite a reliance on dangerous ’launch on
warning’ strategies.
Deterrence not affected
The effects of test limitations of the sort dis-
cussed here carry over into the post-deploy-
ment phase of new weaponry. Virtually all
missiles must undergo proof-testing to check
for various forms of time-induced and storage-
induced deterioration. While this can be partly
established by surrogate forms of testing, ac-
tual flight tests of a statistically significant
sample of the deployed system must also be
performed to acquire an adequate estimate of
the arsenal’s reliability.3 Were this not possi-
ble, confidence in the missile’s ability to per-
form its mission may diminish. This would not
affect the real or perceived ability to strike
retaliatory countervalue blows and deterrence
should remain unaffected. But the ability to
undertake far more exacting counterforce op-
erations would come to be seriously ques-
tioned, the temptation to launch disabling first-
strikes in crisis situations would decrease, and
the danger of nuclear warfare would be miti-
gated.
Reference to flight test restriction is not
entirely absent from arms control discussions.
Indeed, both the Kennedy-Hatfield and the
Gore proposals make incidental allusion to
such restrictions. Still, more than this is needed
and an explicit and comprehensive program
designed to accomplish such limitations should
be designed - as a complement, rather than a
supplement, to other strategies.
An additional appeal of this approach is that
the issue of verifiability should not be very
contentious. Test firings of strategic missiles
are continuously and adequately monitored via
’national technical means’, i.e., satellite photo-
graphy and radar, and any violation of an
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agreement could easily be detected. In addi-
tion, the apparently decreasing Soviet aversion
to the idea of on-site inspections might remove
even the most remote chance of clandestine
non-compliance.
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